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Raising productivity in large factories is 
increasingly seen as an important channel to 
foster growth and alleviate poverty. Bloom et al. (2013) show that an intensive, and expensive, 
consulting program substantially increases pro-
ductivity in a sample of textile factories in India. 
But many programs, often publicly supported 
with aid money, offer less intensive and less 
expensive training and consulting services for 
workers and floor managers. The sustainability 
of these consulting and training interventions 
rests on developing a market for these services.
We undertake an experiment to understand 
both the effectiveness of, and the demand for, a 
variety of training programs among large-scale 
garment manufacturers in Bangladesh. The 
project complements a well-developed recent 
literature on the effects of training programs 
for micro and small firms (see McKenzie and 
Woodruff 2014 for a review) and deepens our 
understanding of (the lack of) managerial cap-
ital in developing countries (see, e.g., Bruhn, 
Karlan, and Schoar 2010).
In this paper we report results from a pilot 
marketing experiment in which we explore the 
demand for a training program for line super-
visors and the constraints that might prevent 
a market for training services from operating 
efficiently or even emerging at all. Beyond its 
intrinsic relevance, the Bangladeshi garment 
sector offers an ideal opportunity to study 
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demand for training. The market is huge: more 
than 3,000 exporting factories are believed to 
employ between 100,000 and 150,000 line level 
supervisors. The industry has now been around 
for almost three decades and many observers 
agree that deficiencies in managerial capital 
among line supervisors contribute to both low 
productivity and poor labor relations in the 
industry. These conditions, one would imag-
ine, could lead to a potentially large demand for 
training services. Yet despite donors’ activism, 
a proper market for training services has failed 
to develop: fewer than 10 percent of existing 
supervisors have received any formal training.
I. Setup and Experiment
We partner up with a local service provider (LSP) to market a training program to garment 
factories. The curriculum of the training pro-
gram was developed by local training centers 
and GIZ, the German Technical Cooperation 
Agency, with a long history and a good reputa-
tion in the sector. The training consisted of six 
days of training for existing line supervisors. 
Three modules with self-contained curricula 
were offered: production planning and processes (P), processes to enhance quality (Q), and HR 
practices, leadership, and social compliance (H).
Using transaction-level customs records 
we constructed a sample of 632 exporters in 
Dhaka.1 We matched the names of the factories 
with a number of directories to obtain contact 
details of the factories. We were able to find cur-
rent contact information for 288 factories. Using 
the customs data, we also categorized factories 
1 There are 1,433 exporters operating in Dhaka for the 
relevant period. We trimmed the sample to focus on export-
ers accounting for 95 percent of exports volumes across all 
products in the 27 largest destination markets. We excluded 
exporters we had worked with to evaluate the training 
programs. 
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as above or below median according to three 
characteristics: size (measured in export reve-
nues), quality of buyers sourcing from the fac-
tory (a weighted average of unit prices paid by 
buyers in the market), and quality (the residual 
of a simple logit demand estimation).2
Working with the LSP and GIZ, we produced a 
high-quality bilingual brochure and professional 
video describing the training program. Each fac-
tory was then approached by phone by a trained 
member of staff working for the LSP. A trained 
enumerator recorded information from the phone 
call and from the overall marketing process.
Factories were told that the LSP was running 
a campaign to increase awareness of its training 
services, offering training at a discount. Each 
factory was offered to purchase slots in training 
sessions at randomly selected prices. The offered 
prices ranged from approximately 60 percent to 
100 percent of the estimated full cost of offer-
ing the program. In addition, the factories were 
offered a free slot in a randomly selected module (P, Q, H) to allow them to test the suitability of 
the program.3
II. Results
We are interested in three main outcomes: (i) whether, conditional on establishing contact 
with the factory, the factory accepted an offer to 
send additional information by mail; (ii) whether 
the factory took up the free slot, (iii) questions 
raised by factories and reasons for refusing the 
additional information and/or the free slot offer.
A. Demand for Additional Information on the 
Training Program
Table 1 reports results. A factory is considered 
to have been reached only if we could deliver 
the sales pitch to a decision manager—hence-
forth, DM—typically the HR manager. Out of 
288 firms in the sample, we reached 183 DMs 
and delivered the pitch in 135 cases. Column 1 
shows that, although the chance of being reached 
2 Further details on these variables are available upon 
request. 
3 Since the training is conducted outside the factory at 
facilities run by the LSP, the free module was intended to 
allow factories to learn not only about the “quality” of the 
training, but also about other practical aspects, such as con-
venience of the location and teaching hours. 
is slightly higher when the free slot is offered 
in the Q model and is lower for large firms, the 
treatment variables and the firm’s characteristics 
do not jointly predict whether a firm was reached 
or not (F-test 1.46, p-value 0.19). Consequently, 
the remainder of the analysis focuses on the 135 
firms we reached.4
Columns 2 to 4 consider whether the fac-
tory asked to be sent additional information on 
the training. Of the 135 reached factories, 120 
requested additional information. Column 2 
shows that the modules P and Q have a 15 per-
cent higher chance of leading to a request for 
additional information. The effect of price is neg-
ative, but small and very far from being statisti-
cally significant.
Column 3 explores interactions between the 
price offered and the module offered for the 
free slot. We find a negative elasticity of addi-
tional information being requested with respect 
to prices when the H module is offered, but not 
when the P and Q modules are offered.
Column 4 explores the interactions between 
the price offered and firm characteristics. There 
is a negative elasticity with respect to prices, but 
not for firms that are larger or that have higher 
quality buyers.
In sum, the first stage of the marketing reveals 
that there is a lower and more elastic potential 
demand for the training module in HR practices 
and social compliance and a somewhat less elas-
tic demand for larger firms and firms exporting 
to higher quality buyers.
B. Take-Up of the Free Slot
The marketing material was sent to the 120 
factories that demanded additional informa-
tion. In a follow-up phone call, we tried to 
 re-establish contact with the factories to offer 
up the free slot.
Columns 5 to 8 report the results. Out of 
the 120 factories that requested additional 
 information, we were able to have a second 
4 For the factories with whom we could reach a deci-
sion-maker but couldn’t deliver the pitch, the main reasons 
were (multiple codes allowed): 33 percent decision-maker 
is too busy, 35 percent cases we were referred elsewhere, 
7 percent of cases the call dropped for technical reasons, 3 
percent pitch was interrupted, 17 percent not interested, 22 
percent other sparse reasons (e.g., manager is on a trip, train-
ing curriculum not relevant for the factory, etc.) 
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 conversation with only 86. There is evidence 
that decision-makers could be more easily 
reached when the  free-module offered was 
P and in larger factories. Although the lin-
ear relationship is not statistically significant, 
higher prices tend to be associated with a 
higher likelihood of being able to talk again 
with the decision-maker (column 5). Only 16 
factories—19 percent of those reached on the 
second call, but less than 6 percent of the initial 
sample—took up the free slot. Columns 6 to 8 
explore drivers of the decision to take-up the 
free slot on the sample of factories we could 
contact with the first call (column 6), the sam-
ple requesting additional information (column 
7), and the  sample we were able to contact at 
follow-up (column 8). In all specifications we 
find no effect of the treatment variables, includ-
ing prices, on take-up of the free slot. There 
is some indication that larger firms are more 
likely to take-up the free slot.
C. Points of Discussion, Questions, and  
Reasons for Rejecting the Offer
Throughout the process, we recorded the 
points of discussion, the questions raised, and 
the reasons given for turning down an offer. We 
have records for 135 conversations during the 
first call and for 78 conversations at follow-up.
Table 1
Initial call Follow-up call
Reached Info requested Reached Free slot take-up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Price 0.0097 −0.0201 −0.0800 −0.0547 0.023 0.020 0.024 0.019
(0.0146) (0.0128) (0.024)*** (0.0261)** (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.020)
Module P 0.0525 0.1506 −0.8032 0.1485 0.202 0.009 −0.019 −0.030
(0.0711) (0.066)** (0.3562)** (0.0657)** (0.102)** (0.070) (0.081) (0.109)
Module Q 0.138 0.161 −0.6720 0.1457 0.064 0.0503 0.0275 0.0570
(0.072)* (0.064)** (0.3493)* (0.0647)** (0.100) (0.0686) (0.0790) (0.0115)
Higher demand −0.0628 −0.0844 −0.0860 0.092 −0.078 −0.043 −0.032 −0.051
(0.0587) (0.0528) (0.0516)* (0.280) (0.082) (0.056) (0.063) (0.088)
Better buyers 0.0359 0.0588 0.0525 −0.4125 0.117 0.038 0.031 0.027
(0.0588) (0.0527) (0.0514) (0.2809) (0.081) (0.056) (0.063) (0.088)
Larger firms −0.1062 0.0709 0.0664 −0.3472 0.159 0.112 0.112 0.121
(0.0586)* (0.0528) (0.0517) (0.2814) (0.082)* (0.056)** (0.062)* (0.086)
Module P × price 0.0866
(0.032)***
Module Q × price 0.0760
(0.0316)**
Higher demand × price −0.0153
(0.0253)
Better buyers × price 0.0430
(0.0255)*
Larger firm × price 0.0376
(0.0255)
F-test 1.46 2.73 3.20 2.42 2.25 1.38 1.20 0.75
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.01 −0.02
Observations 288 135 135 135 135 135 120 86
Notes: Price is randomly offered price (either 8,500, 9,250, 11,625 or 14,000 Bangladeshi Taka (1 US $ = 78 BDT)). Module 
P (production processes) and Q (quality control) refer to randomly offered free-slot (omitted category module H, human 
resources and social compliance). Higher demand = 1 if the firm is above the median in the sample w.r.t. a residual from a 
logit demand estimation (details available upon request). Better buyer = 1 if the firm is above the median in the sample w.r.t. a 
weighted average of the unit prices paid by its buyers in the market. Larger firms = 1 if the firm is above the median w.r.t. export 
revenues in the sample. Column 1 is on the whole sample. Columns 2–6 are on the sample of firms that were reached. Column 7 
is on the sample of firms that requested information after the first call. Column 8 is on the sample of reached firms among those.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Points of Discussion.—Figure 1, panel A, 
describes the points of discussion in both the 
first and follow-up calls. We code 12 aspects we 
intended to cover during the sales pitch. These 
include, among others, introduction to the local 
service provider, the curriculum of the various 
modules, discussion of the initial free slot offer, 
as well as other practical details. The figure 
shows that, while the essential information was 
covered in almost all calls, intended beneficia-
ries and the training method were less likely to 
be covered. Significantly less information was 
exchanged during the follow-up call than in the 
initial call.
Questions Raised.—We also recorded the 
questions asked during these conversations by 
the factories (see panel B of Figure 1). Two pat-
terns emerge. First, with the exception of ques-
tions pertaining to the credentials of the local 
service provider, many more questions were 
asked in the follow-up call than in the intro-
ductory call.5 Second, relative to practicalities 
and administrative issues, questions regarding 
 curriculum of modules offered or even pricing 
were less common.
5 This is not entirely driven by less interested factories 
dropping out at follow-up: the comparison holds true when 
conditioning on factories reached at follow-up. 
In general, phone calls in which more ques-
tions were raised are far more likely to result 
in a positive outcome: a request of information 
during the first call and taking up the free slot at 
follow-up. This is true not just considering all 
questions taken together, but also for specific 
dimensions. For example, six types of ques-
tions (Participation, Practicalities, Scheduling, 
Free Module, Pricing, Approval from Superior) 
correlate with a positive outcome in the initial 
call, and eight dimensions (Resources, Module 
P, Training Method, Participation, Practicalities, 
Scheduling, Free Module, Administration) cor-
relate with taking up the free slot at follow-up. 
There are two notable exceptions: questions 
about training certificates to be issued to work-
ers and concerns over trainees leaving the fac-
tory once the training is completed correlate 
with a lower likelihood of a positive outcome at 
both stages.
In general, treatment variables (price and 
free module) and firm characteristics do not 
explain much of the variation in the number 
or type of questions raised during the initial 
or follow-up call. There is some evidence 
that firms supplying buyers paying higher 
prices asked fewer questions at both stages. A 
higher price leads to more questions at the 
follow-up stage (the  correlation is negative, 
but not statistically significant at the initial 
call).
Figure 1
Notes: The figure describes Discussion Points (panel A) and Questions Raised (panel B) during 135 completed first call and 
86 completed follow-up calls. Both Discussion Points and Questions Raised had been pre-classified into the reported catego-
ries following extensive piloting.
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Reasons for Rejecting the Offer.—In general, 
scheduling a conversation with the decision-maker 
was difficult. In most cases (33 percent at first call 
and 87 percent at follow-up) the decision-maker 
was said to be too busy.6 For 40 firms, we were 
able to code the reasons for definitively rejecting 
the offer at either the initial call (15 firms) or at 
follow-up (25 firms). For simplicity, we bundle 
the responses at the two different stages. The 
following reasons, ranked by importance, were 
mentioned as the reason the additional informa-
tion or free slot was turned down: (i) production 
pressure is too high (25 percent); (ii) factory is 
unable to spare supervisors (20 percent); (iii) 
DM does not believe training would be effective (15 percent); (iv) the factory is unwilling to train 
supervisors outside its premises (15 percent); (v) 
migration concerns, i.e., trained supervisors will 
leave the factory after completing the training (10 
percent); (vi) training is too long. It is interesting 
to note that only two factories (coded as selling 
to higher quality buyers) mentioned they already 
offered training to supervisors and only one fac-
tory mentioned the training was too expensive. 
Conditional on refusal, factory characteristics do 
not explain much of the variation in the reasons 
given for turning down the free slot.
III. Conclusions
We set out to market a training program for 
lower level managers (line supervisors) to large 
factories in the Bangladeshi ready-made gar-
ment industry. The program was offered by an 
established local service provider and developed 
by a reputable technical cooperation agency with 
a long experience in the industry. The program 
was tailored to the needs of garment factories, as 
assessed during the enrollment phase of a differ-
ent program that trained predominantly female 
line operators to become line supervisors (see 
Macchiavello, Menzel, and Woodruff 2014).
A number of results emerge. First, take-up 
of the program—even for a free slot—was very 
low. Qualitative information coded during the 
initial interactions with the factories, suggests 
that intense production pressures are an import-
ant reason for the low demand. High production 
6 The lower percentage in the initial call is explained by 
the fact that many calls had to be used to locate the appropri-
ate decision-maker. 
pressures are somewhat intrinsic to the indus-
try in which just-in-time, short lead-time, and 
reliability in deliveries are key sources of com-
parative advantage, but are exacerbated by an 
environment characterized by frequent shocks. 
Managers high up in the factory hierarchy, such 
as Human Resource Managers, then, appear to 
be engaged in constant fire-fighting.
Second, take up of the program appears to be 
quite insensitive to pricing. Since we did price 
the program close to a commercially viable 
rate, this suggests that, in principle, it could be 
possible to develop a market for such training 
services—provided they could be proved to be 
effective.
Third, there appeared to be higher interest 
in and demand for training modules aimed at 
improving production processes and quality, 
rather than human resources and social compli-
ance—despite the fact we marketed the program 
mostly to human resource managers. Evidence 
is lacking on the relative merits of these two 
types of programs. A priority for future research 
is to assess how the demand for this type of pro-
gram is influenced by experience with the pro-
gram as well as with more rigorous information 
on their effects. Research to evaluate the effects 
of this training program on a sample of compa-
rable factories is currently underway.
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